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Abstract
We explore whether investment in public school infrastructure af-
fects students’ achievement. We use data on extra funding to public
high schools after the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake and apply a
quasi-experimental design and an instrumental variable strategy. We
find that spending on school infrastructure increases standardized test
scores in mathematics and Italian language, and the effect is stronger
for lower-achieving students and in mathematics. These results pro-
vide evidence in favor of a positive impact of capital spending in im-
proving the learning environment and performances of high school
students.
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1 Introduction
Whether or not school spending has an impact on student outcomes has been
highly debated in the last sixty years in the economics literature (Card &
Krueger, 1996). The debate roots from the so-called Coleman Report, pub-
lished by the US Government in 1966. Coleman’s (1966) main conclusion
was that school funding does not play a central role in determining students’
achievement, giving rise to a wealth of studies on the link between resources
and educational outcomes (see e.g., Neilson & Zimmerman, 2014; Jackson
et al. , 2016). Overall, there is a lack of agreement on the impact of funding
on students’ performances. Whereas in a meta-analysis Greenwald et al.
(1996, p.384) conclude that “school resources are systematically related to
student achievement and that these relations are large enough to be educa-
tionally important,” many subsequent studies find little or no effect (see e.g.,
Hanushek, 1996; Card & Krueger, 1996).
This disagreement is perhaps not very surprising as most of these studies
face severe difficulties in attempting to unravel a causal relationship between
school spending and educational outcome. Counterfactual outcomes are sen-
sitive to the choice of the estimator and the identification strategy to address
the endogeneity of school resources. Although previous studies have used a
variety of methodological approaches to deal with the joint determination of
educational inputs and outputs, modest estimated effects of school spend-
ing could be a consequence of unresolved endogeneity biases (see Jackson
et al. , 2016). At the same time, studies often explore very heterogeneous
inputs of the educational production process. Jones & Zimmer (2001) note
that most of the literature focuses on school-specific inputs, school orga-
nization inputs (e.g., class size), environmental characteristics and socioe-
conomic (family) characteristics, but neglect capital inputs such as school
infrastructure. In fact, there are only a handful of studies on the school
infrastructure-students’ learning relationship and they focus preponderantly
on the US School System. Aaronson & Mazumder (2011) investigate the
impact of the so-called “Rosenwald initiative” in the US between 1914 and
1931 and find that substantial improvements to school quality and access
in relatively deprived environments are followed by large productivity gains.
Neilson & Zimmerman (2014) find strong evidence that school construction
programs led, among other outcomes, to sustained gains in reading scores for
elementary and middle school students. Yet, Martorell et al. (2016), who
focuses more specifically on school facility investments, find little evidence
that spending on facilities generate improvements in student achievement.
Against this background, we explore whether spending on physical infras-
tructure affects test scores in mathematics and Italian language using data
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on Italian public high schools. To handle the endogeneity of idiosyncratic
changes in school funding, we use two strategies. First, we employ a quasi-
experimental design and make use of information on the extra funding that a
specific group of schools received in the aftermath of the 2012 Northern Italy
earthquake. In May 2012, two major earthquakes in Northern Italy caused
considerable damages to public buildings and prompted specific interventions
for the mitigation of seismic risk. As a result, a large number of undamaged
schools, but close enough to the areas hit by the earthquake, received large
extra funds to modernize and improve the quality of their buildings as well
as their resilience to the earthquakes. We compute the differential effect of
receiving extra funds on the treatment group, i.e., undamaged schools out-
side the earthquake area, that were awarded special funding, versus a control
group of schools in neighboring municipalities. The schools in the control
group are in areas sufficiently far from the earthquake epicenter and at low
risk of future seismic activities; therefore these schools are both undamaged
as well as unfunded. This strategy allows us to estimate whether being a
recipient of funding increases students’ achievement. Second, to evaluate the
elasticity of test scores with respect to funding, we implement an instrumen-
tal variables (IV) identification strategy. In particular, we use seismic hazard
maps and exploit exogenous values of peak ground acceleration (henceforth
PGA), which explain much of the variation in the amount of the received
funding. Taken together, our results suggest that improving the quality of
school buildings has a positive effect on students’ achievements. Moreover,
we find that low-achieving students benefit the most from improved physical
infrastructure.
2 Data
2.1 The 2012 Northern Italy earthquake and school
funding
Deciphering the impact of school resources on achievements is complicated
by the fact that students’ performance and the selection of funded schools, or
the spending levels, are potentially simultaneously determined. We address
this issue by using data on school funding provided after a natural disaster.
On May 20, 2012 an earthquake of magnitude 6.1, followed by a second
one on May 29, hit a territory of 3.5 thousands squared kilometers in the
Northern part of Emilia-Romagna, a region near the borders with Veneto
and Lombardia. Before the 2012 seismic events, this area was generally not
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considered at risk of seismic activities.1
In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Italian government made available
more than 24.4 millions of euros to several public buildings in the affected
municipalities, including 276 high schools, with the aim of reconstructing
damaged buildings, renewing and maintaining all school buildings as well as
keeping undamaged buildings safe from future seismic threats. In fact, this
extra funding was given to both damaged schools as well as to schools con-
sidered at risk for earthquakes in the future. We use several legislative acts
to assemble data on the amount of extra funding to public schools in the
region.2 As the earthquake could have had a direct effect on the learning en-
vironment and on students’ performances, we use information on the volume
of damaged buildings in each municipality, as estimated by the INGV (Na-
tional Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology) in the aftermath of the seism
using a microseismic survey.3 Then, for our empirical analysis we select only
municipalities where “no damage” was reported by the INGV assessment.
In more details, we collect data for a total of 236 municipalities, as shown
on the map in Figure 1. Out of 236, 69 are discarded as they had a level of
damage greater than 0, on a scale between 0 “no damage” and 5 “destruction”
(see grey shaded areas in Figure 1). Out of the 167 remaining municipalities,
only 43 have at least one school, for a total of 173 schools (white dots in Figure
1). The treated schools are those located in treated municipalities (shaded
areas in Figure 1) and make up a good portion of the total number of schools,
39% (68). Although these schools reported no damage, they received about
3.6 millions of euros to improve the quality of their buildings. Summary
statistics, reported in Table A.1 in the appendix, show that these schools
received on average about 1,000 euros per student. This is an exceptional
amount of funding, as the average total spending per student in Italy in 2013
was only 9,174 euros; perhaps most importantly, however, capital spending
was less than 184 euros in the same year, which makes this extra funding
a very large intervention (see OECD, 2016). Our control group is made up
1With the exception of the seismic sequence of Ferrara in 1570, Argenta in 1624 and
Bologna in 1929 (Vannoli et al. , 2015), few other small intensity earthquakes had had an
impact on its inhabitants’ collective memory. As a result, the perception of a seismic risk
was comparably very small relative to the rest of Italy. In fact, PGA values in this area
are, on average, only 20% of those characterizing the nearby Apennine mountain chain.
See http://zonesismiche.mi.ingv.it/
2Starting from June 2012, the deputy commissioner enacted a series of legislative acts
with guidelines for securing school buildings as well as criteria to assign available funds. See
http://www.regione.emilia-romagna.it/terremoto/gli-atti-per-la-ricostruzione/2012. A
list of funds awarded in Emilia-Romagna is available at http://bur.regione.emilia-
romagna.it/dettaglio-inserzione?i=e859a4a07037459a9547ab738738c751.
3See Appendix A.1 for a through description of the microseismic survey.
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of 105 schools that received no funding and they were not affected by the
earthquake, but they are located in municipalities proximate to the treated
areas (i.e., they either share borders with the treated areas or there is no
more than one municipality between them and the treated areas, see dashed
areas in Figure 1).
The map also contains information on the PGA values, gathered from
the INGV database. The color bar shows the gradient of PGA for each
municipality, from low to high. PGA is the maximum ground acceleration
during earthquakes and it is commonly used as an index for seismic hazard,
the probability that an earthquake will occur in a specific geographic area.
In our sample, the PGA varies between 0.087 and 0.207, with an average
intensity of 0.155. The amount of extra funding per student in the treated
areas was mostly driven by the necessity of safeguarding school buildings,
in areas close enough to the earthquake crater, from future seismic threats
and minimize potential damages to school infrastructure, hence is a function,
among other things, of PGA levels.4
2.2 Test scores
Information on test scores is taken from the Italian National Institute for
the Evaluation of the Educational System (INVALSI). Since the academic
year 2010/2011, tenth graders in Italian high schools take standardized as-
sessments on the same day (May 9). The participation of all public schools
is compulsory and the assessment encompasses only mathematics and Italian
language skills. Our dependent variable is the percentage of correct answers
for each high school. From the same database, we also take information on
school size and on the shares of male and native students in each school.5
For each school, we also compute average test scores for low-achieving and
high-achieving students, the fraction of students in the 5th/10th percentile
of the score distribution and in the 90th/95th percentile, respectively. We
assemble school-level annual data over six academic years, from 2011 to 2016.
4See the first decrees enacted by the deputy commissioner, i.e., ODC #2 (16 June 2012)
and the ODC #4 (3 July 2012).
5We refer the interested reader to Angrist et al. (2014) and Battistin & Meroni (2016)
for a thorough description of the test and a more comprehensive overview than we can
possibly give here. Battistin & Meroni (2016) also offer a novel study on instruction time
and students’ performance in Italy, using the same data.
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3 Empirical strategy
Our identification strategy is twofold. First, we use the quasi-experimental
setting induced by the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake to get a handle on the
direction of causation in the infrastructure spending – students’ achievement
relationship. Using information from the map in Figure 1, we can measure
the impact of receiving additional resources on test scores by comparing the
evolution of test scores before and after the policy introduction in the areas
exposed to this policy as compared to those that were not. We use a sim-
ple empirical research design, a difference-in-differences estimation strategy,
which takes the following form:
log yit = α0 + α1Di + α2Pt−1 + α3Di ∗ Pt−1 +X ′itα4+
+ µi + ηp ∗ Pt + θTrend+ εit
(1)
where the outcome variable yit denotes the average test score in either math-
ematics or Italian language in school i in year t; Di is a dummy that takes
value one if the school belongs to the treated area; Pt is a dummy that
takes value one if the observation is in the post-treatment period (i.e., post
2012);6 Xit is a vector of school covariates which includes school size and the
shares of male and native students in each school; µi is the school fixed effect,
which absorb school-specific constant (or slow-moving) features; as provinces
could have implemented local interventions after the earthquake, we interact
province fixed effect ηp with Pt to control for province-specific policies after
2012;7 θ is the coefficient of a school-specific time trend variable and εit is an
error or disturbance term. Di ∗ Pt is the interaction between the treatment
schools Di and Pt, the dummy variable equal to one in the post-treatment
period; therefore, α3 is our parameter of interest, the difference-in-differences
estimates of the impact of receiving funding on students’ achievement. Note
that, for small values of the coefficient, 100*α3 can be interpreted as the
percentage increase in the test score when schools receive extra funding.
Second, we want to offer estimates of the elasticity of test scores with
respect to spending per capita. Yet, as noted above, idiosyncratic changes in
school spending are likely endogenous as the amount of funding allocated to
each school can be correlated with unobservable school-level characteristics.
To quantify this relation, we estimate 2SLS models where we instrument for
6We lag the treatment by one year to allow time for the funding to be invested.
7A province is an administrative division between a municipality and a region, and
constitute the third NUTS administrative level. Provinces have, among other functions,
the local planning and the coordination of schools activities. In our sample, we have a
total of 10 provinces.
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school spending with the values of peak ground acceleration (PGA), the max-
imum ground acceleration during the earthquakes. Recall that funding was
allocated to schools to improve the resilience of their buildings to earthquakes
and more funding per capita was granted to schools in municipalities with
higher earthquake risks. The proposed instrument is thus strongly correlated
with school funding. At the same time, it is uncorrelated with school-level
unobservables that might affect test scores. Thus, PGA offers a valid instru-
ment.
The second stage of the IV estimation is given by:
log yit = β0 + β1F̂UNDit−1 +X ′itβ2 + µi + ηp ∗ Pt + θTrend+ εit (2)
where the outcome variable yit, the vector of controls at the school level,
the trend variables and the fixed effects are the same as in equation (1).
F̂UNDit is the estimated funding per pupil as predicted by the first stage.
The equation we estimate in the first stage uses the PGA level in the area
where the school is located as an instrument for actual funding. Given the
log-linearity of the model, the interpretation of β1 is that of a proportional
change in the test score given a unit change in funding, holding all else
constant.
4 Results
In Table 1 we present the relation between funding and student scores in
mathematics, whereas in Table 2 we focus on Italian language. In column 1 of
each table we report the average score for all students, in columns 2 and 3 the
test scores for students in the 5th and 10th percentile of the score distribution
(i.e., low-achieving students), and in columns 4 and 5 the test scores for
students in the 90th and 95th percentile (i.e. high-achieving students).
In panels A we show a naive OLS estimation, which reveals a positive
correlation between funding per pupil and test scores.If for purely illustrative
purposes one interprets the OLS estimates as causal, then, according to the
estimates, a one-unit increase in school infrastructure spending per student
(that is, 100 euro) is associated with an estimated increase in test scores in
mathematics in the range of 0.2% to 1.4%, holding all else constant. The
relation is insignificant at conventional levels when we replace test scores in
mathematics with those in Italian language (Panel A, Table 2).8
8Note that all models include the share of males, of native students and the total number
of students in each school as well as school fixed effects, time trends and interactions
between province fixed effects and post-treatment period dummy. Using linear trends,
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In panel B we turn to our quasi-experimental design and we uncover a
positive effect of receiving extra funding on test scores, although the relation
is still not significantly different from zero for Italian language. In more
details, test scores will increase by 10% overall if a school is a recipient
of funding, and the effect is substantially larger for low-achieving students
(between 26% and 33%).
Turning to the elasticity of student outcomes with respect to the amount
of resources devoted to school Infrastructure, recall that in Panel A our
main coefficients of interest is most certainly contaminated by endogeneity
from uncontrolled confounding variables. Therefore in panel C we turn to
the estimated coefficient of school funding in the second stage of our 2SLS.
We use the PGA, an index of seismic hazard, as exogenous instrument. As
we can see, the coefficients are now substantially larger than those of the
naive regressions in panel A and they are all statistically different from zero.
Distributing an extra 100 euro per pupil to schools will produce an estimated
test score gains in mathematics in the range of 1.5% to almost 13%. Again, we
find that the marginal return to investment in school infrastructure is greater
the lower the quality of the students. Interestingly, we now obtain similar
results with test scores in Italian language and the estimated magnitudes
of the relationship between funding and students’ achievement are not only
statistically significant but also economically meaningful.
In panel D we show the reduced form and the first stage estimates. As
expected, in the reduced form we find that an increase in the PGA level leads
to a higher amount of infrastructure funding received by the school. At the
same time, the first stage reveals that the PGA level has a sizeable impact on
school funding. We report the Kleinbergen-Paap F-Statistic, which is similar
to the conventional F-statistic, but takes into account the clustering of the
standard errors. The values are all above conventional levels characterizing
weak instruments.
To dig deeper into the relationship between school funding and students’
standardized test scores, Figure 2 shows the relation between the estimated
coefficient β1 in equation (2) and the quantiles of the distribution of the test
scores. As the figure clearly reveals, allocating additional funding to schools’
infrastructure has higher marginal effects on the achievement of students with
the lowest scores on the standardized tests. Whereas in Italian language the
pattern is less clear-cut, in mathematics the estimated effect decreases mono-
tonically as we move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the standardized
test score distribution. Results are overall similar when we look at relation
quadratic trends, cubic polynomial in time (i.e., t, t2, and t3) or year dummies produce
similar results.
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between the estimated coefficient α3 in equation (1) and the quantiles of the
distribution of test scores (see Figure A1). We can conclude from these two
tables that the previous results using a difference-in-differences approach are
strongly borne out by this new set of empirical results. The effect of school
funding on students’ achievement is overall quantitative large, statistically
significant and robust, in particular in mathematics and for low-achieving
students.
5 Conclusion
In this research note we explore the impact of school infrastructure invest-
ments on students’ achievement. We use data on school funding provided
after a natural disaster, a magnitude 6.0 earthquake that hit the North-
ern part of Emilia Romagna region in May 2012, affecting an area of 3,500
squared kilometers. We use information on the allocation process (whether
schools received funding or not) and on the amount of funding that each
school received (function of pre-determined seismic risks) to implement two
intertwined yet different identification strategies, so as to give our regression
estimates a causal interpretation.
Our empirical results provide evidence in favor of a positive and quite
large return of school infrastructure spending on students’ education. As
such, this study outlines the role of physical capital spending in improving the
learning environment of tenth graders and offers potential policy prescriptions
for investing in school infrastructure.
There are important limitations that we are unable to address in this
note. We do not have information on how exactly buildings were improved
after receiving the extra funding; therefore we do not know what are the un-
derlying causal mechanism linking better infrastructures to test score gains.
As Martorell et al. (2016) outlined in their contribution, there might be
several, potential mechanisms at play such as the improvement in tempera-
ture control; modernization in infrastructure to support the latest technology
or labs for science education; infrastructure enhancements to avoid chronic
distractions and reduce the number of missed school days. Low-quality facili-
ties could also undermine effort, especially of low-achieving students. In fact,
whereas it is plausible that low-achieving students display higher marginal
returns to investment in schooling than high-achieving students, we still do
not know what exactly makes them more likely to benefit from an improve-
ment in physical environment of schools. Yet, because of the limited number
of empirical works on how school infrastructure spending affects educational
outcomes and the lack of consensus on a number of key questions, there is
9
definitely a busy agenda for future research in this area.
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Figure 1: Treated and control areas
11
Figure 2: Estimated impact of school funding on test scores by quantiles of
the distribution of test scores
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Table 1: Secondary School, Mathematics: funding and students scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Score (mean) Score (p5) Score (p10) Score (p90) Score (p95) Funding p.c.
Panel A OLS Estimation.
Funding p.c. 0.003∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B OLS Estimation.
Spending dummy 0.099∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.040∗
(0.024) (0.094) (0.063) (0.021) (0.021)
Panel C IV Estimation – Second Stage.
Funding p.c. 0.046∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.028) (0.023) (0.006) (0.005)
KP F-Statistic 18.522 18.522 18.522 18.522 18.522
Panel D Reduced Form and First Stage.
Seismic hazard 1.204∗∗∗ 3.284∗∗∗ 2.803∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 26.128∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.441) (0.291) (0.093) (0.099) (6.070)
Observations 692 692 692 692 692 692
Ni 173 173 173 173 173 173
Notes: School Fixed-effect models. All regressions include fraction of males, fraction of native students, and number
of students in the tenth cohort as well as linear trend and province dummies interacted with Pt. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Secondary School, Italian: funding and students scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Score (mean) Score (p5) Score (p10) Score (p90) Score (p95) Funding p.c.
Panel A OLS Estimation.
Funding p.c. 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B OLS Estimation.
Spending dummy 0.020 0.073 0.051 0.008 0.005
(0.022) (0.064) (0.042) (0.019) (0.019)
Panel C IV Estimation – Second Stage.
Funding p.c. 0.012∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
KP F-Statistic 15.841 15.841 15.841 15.841 15.841
Panel D Reduced Form and First Stage.
Seismic hazard 0.328∗∗∗ 0.623∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 27.413∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.345) (0.197) (0.106) (0.109) (6.887)
Observations 696 696 696 696 696 696
Ni 173 173 173 173 173 173
Notes: School Fixed-effect models. All regressions include fraction of males, fraction of native students, and number
of students in the tenth cohort as well as linear trend and province dummies interacted with Pt. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
14
A Online Appendix
A.1 The earthquake and the INGV microseismic sur-
vey
Generally, after an earthquake, first responders are also responsible for collecting the
intensity values of the earthquake for the damaged localities, both in terms of European
Macroseismic Scale (EMS-98) and Mercalli-Cancani-Sieberg macroseismic scale, MCS (see
for more details Gru¨nthal, 1998 and Sieberg, 1930). For Italy this is commonly done
by the Italian Civil Protection Department (DPC) supported by other institutions such
as the National Research Council (CNR) or the National Institute of Geophysicss and
Volcanology (INGV).
The macroseismic survey for the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake, was performed ini-
tially adopting the MCS scale (according to the Italian macroseismic database, DBMI11)
also in order to provide a quick way to estimate the damage distribution of the earthquake
over the entire territory. Subsequently, the macroseismic intensity values are reported in
terms of EMS-98 scale by the knowledge of the percentage of the damaged buildings and
their vulnerability in each locality. The results of the survey are provided in Galli et al.,
2012.
Then, by knowing macroseismic intensity values in EMS-98 scale and the level of
vulnerability of buildings, it is possible to estimate the damage of the buildings of any single
area according to a method proposed by Bernardini et al. (2007). Indeed, according to the
EMS-98 scale, buildings are grouped into 6 classes of vulnerability (A, highest vulnerability,
to F) in relation to the structural characteristics of the buildings (e.g. typological and
morphological information and age of construction of the buildings) and it defines 5 levels
of increasing damage (from D1 to D5, where D0 means no damage).
Operationally, the intensity value is provided by DPC together with the vulnerability
level of buildings (coming from the information provided by the census of 2011) and both
are known at a very low level, namely a census tract. In this way it is possible to calculate
the damage grade (D0 to D5) for each area according to the EMS-98 damage probability
matrices provided by Gra¨nthal, 1998. As an example, if a locality is classified with intensity
IX (EMS-98 scale) it returns that many buildings with medium vulnerability level (class
B) are heavily damaged (D4) as well as few buildings of vulnerability level C, while most
buildings with high vulnerability level (class A) are completely collapsed (D5). Then,
according to Bernardini et al., 2007 it is possible to express in a fuzzy way (e.g. allowing
for a numerical quantification) the linguistic expressions ‘few’, ‘many’, ‘most’. This allows
to define a damage probability matrices, one for each vulnerability class of the buildings. In
the epicentral area, because of the jointly effect of moderate magnitude of the earthquake
and the characteristics of buildings, most of these have experienced no damage (D0) or
light damage (D1).
A.2 Tables and Figures
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Table A1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max count
Panel A – Treatment and IV
Spending dummy 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 173
Funding per capita (00)a 3.89 10.29 0.00 80.65 173
Funding per capita (00)b 9.91 14.53 0.73 80.65 68
Seismic hazard (PGA) 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.21 173
Panel B – Mathematics
Score (mean) 3.80 0.33 2.79 4.46 692
Score (p5) 3.09 0.62 0.00 4.30 692
Score (p10) 3.28 0.50 0.00 4.32 692
Score (p90) 4.15 0.28 3.11 4.59 692
Score (p95) 4.22 0.26 3.11 4.59 692
Panel C – Italian Language
Score (mean) 4.10 0.27 1.59 4.50 696
Score (p5) 3.57 0.60 0.00 4.39 696
Score (p10) 3.73 0.47 0.00 4.44 696
Score (p90) 4.34 0.20 1.59 4.58 696
Score (p95) 4.38 0.18 1.59 4.59 696
Panel D – Controls
% Male 0.56 0.26 0.00 1.00 692
% Native 0.82 0.14 0.21 1.00 692
Cohort Size 88.57 77.39 3.00 372.00 692
Notes: a All sample. b Only treated.
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Figure A1: Classification of damage to masonry buildings
17
Figure A2: Estimated impact of receiving extra-funding on test scores by
quantiles of the distribution of test scores
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